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英文解釈の思考プロセス 第202回


今回の題材は、2017年10月24日付の The New York Times 紙に掲載されたビル・ジマーマン氏によるエッセイ、The Four Stages of the Antiwar Movement  ”反戦運動の4つの段階” です。アメリカのヴェトナム戦争への関与が最も高かった1967年から50周年となる本年、そのヴェトナム戦争がアメリカに与えた影響を考察する VIETNAM 67 の一部です。全文の和訳はオリジナルの次にあります。



The Four Stages of the Antiwar Movement


Bill Zimmerman

VIETNAM ’67 OCT. 24, 2017


 Antiwar demonstrators in Washington in October, 1967. Credit Associated Press

The Vietnam antiwar movement, famous for its sound and fury, deserves credit for more. We were the first mass movement against a war in American history and one of its great moral crusades, yet most Americans recall only enormous protests and social chaos. In fact, the 10-year movement, in which I played a role, was a complex phenomenon that evolved strategically as circumstances changed. It can be broken down into four overlapping stages.

The first stage, in 1964 and 1965, was led by two groups: left-wing activists organized into peace groups opposed to the Cold War and American intervention abroad, and college students who had come of age during the Southern civil rights movement and had seen how readily the government could divert its gaze from injustice. When the war expanded in 1965, the fledgling movement adopted two strategic goals: to give activists enough knowledge about Vietnam to be able to draw others into action, and to normalize opposition, since many Americans were hesitant to oppose their own country in a time of war.

The peace groups educated the public and the press. The students invented a new way to train activists, the remarkably successful campus teach-ins, and between March and June, over 120 were held across the country. Public protests were organized to normalize opposition. In April, Students for a Democratic Society drew a surprising 20,000 to the first. In November, the peace organization SANE sponsored another, with a similar turnout. By the end of 1965, this first stage had largely succeeded. Activists gained a deep knowledge of Vietnam and the war, and protests, while still small, did normalize opposition despite accusations that they were un-American. Seeds of doubt planted in the press and the public would flower later.

But the war only escalated. In early 1966, troop deployments, American casualties and draft calls dramatically increased, and college students and their middle-class families, for whom military service was not on the agenda, took notice. Their self-interest triggered a second stage of the antiwar movement, with much bigger and more numerous protests. Establishment voices, including Senator Robert Kennedy and the influential columnist Walter Lippmann, spoke out against the war. Senator J. William Fulbright held televised hearings that brought antiwar views directly into American homes. Throughout 1966 and 1967, leaders from politics, science, medicine, academia, entertainment, the press and even business announced their opposition to the war.

In this second stage, our strategic objectives were to unite various strands of antiwar opposition behind widespread draft resistance and to build opposition to force a political end to the war. Large protests sprang up across the country. In April 1967, a milestone was reached when 500,000 demonstrated against the war in New York, the largest such gathering in history. Self-interested draft avoidance evolved into morally driven draft resistance. The thousands of young men, including Muhammad Ali, unwilling to kill and ready to sacrifice themselves to incarceration or a life of exile moved people of all ages. Their cause inspired others to more forcefully oppose the war.

At the same time, a growing split between protest and resistance became evident. On Oct. 21, 1967, 100,000 people gathered at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington for a demonstration. But this time, 50,000 broke away to join the illegal March on the Pentagon, more Americans ready to commit nonviolent civil disobedience than at any time in history. Thousands broke through military police lines, and a few even penetrated the Pentagon itself. Hundreds were arrested, many of them younger, angrier and more frustrated than the men and women who had led the first wave of opposition.

Protesters attempted to shut down induction centers in Berkeley, Calif., and New York City. Troop trains were impeded. Campus protesters blocked access to military and C.I.A. recruiters. Clergy members dumped blood on draft records. Hippie organizers manipulated the media with attention-getting stunts. Racism became a focus when it was revealed that blacks were drafted, assigned to combat units and killed at rates significantly higher than whites were. In 1968 the nation, and the war, seemed to be spinning out of control: The Tet offensive, the assassinations of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, the widespread racial rebellions and the police violence at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago all made it clear that the political system would not stop the war or reduce the racism and poverty crippling the country. In November, the election of Richard Nixon confirmed those fears.

The two-part strategy of the movement’s second stage, to build a mass movement and convert it into a political force, had succeeded in the first part but failed in the second. With Nixon’s presidency, the strategic rationale for this approach collapsed and pushed the movement into a third stage.

Large protests continued, but few believed they would stop the war. Alienated and enraged, we moved on to widespread civil disobedience, rejection of mainstream lifestyles, violent clashes with police and militant opposition to the government. Our strategy, less coherent than in earlier stages, was to force an end to the war by creating instability, chaos and disruption at home.

Loyalties shifted. Earlier, the dominant slogan had been, “Hey, hey, L.B.J., how many kids did you kill today?” In 1969 it became, “One side’s right, one side’s wrong, victory to the Viet Cong.” Blacks were in revolt after dozens of urban rebellions. Students were further radicalized by the killings at Kent State and Jackson State. Combat soldiers, one in six of whom were addicted to heroin, were refusing to fight, and “fragging,” or killing, officers who ordered them into combat.

Returning soldiers formed Vietnam Veterans Against the War, some tearfully confessing to atrocities committed there. Organizers distributed antiwar literature at military bases, opened coffeehouses nearby to attract antiwar soldiers and helped G.I.s publish antiwar newsletters. Draft resisters had inspired the second stage of the movement. In the third,antiwar G.I.s played that role, and with a much angrier edge.

Rejecting the social order, many activists called themselves revolutionaries. Some embraced Marxist ideologies, often becoming trapped by the arcane factional disputes that seethed among them. Such disputes destroyed Students for a Democratic Society and encouraged a remnant to go underground and set off a series of bombs that humiliated themselves and discredited the movement.

The third stage expired in May 1971. After memorable protests by antiwar vets, including one in which 800 men threw their combat medals over a fence surrounding the Capitol, an attempt by 20,000 activists to shut down the federal government in Washington failed. But a few weeks later, the release of the Pentagon Papers drove public opposition to the war even higher.

Spreading public opposition should have been a victory for the movement; instead, it threw it into crisis. Seasoned activists were moving on to complete deferred professional or academic goals. Many of us who remained realized that a majority of Americans had turned against the war but they felt unable or unwilling to join us because our militancy required them to risk arrest or injury. A new strategy was needed, and a fourth stage of the antiwar movement emerged.

We gave up our militancy, developed inclusive tactics and tried to build a political force to thwart Nixon’s policy of turning over the war to the South Vietnamese government, called Vietnamization. This was not done to repudiate our past but to be more effective going forward. Very quickly, new organizations sprang up to involve people in actions that did not require significant risk.

New groups exposed President Nixon’s escalation of the bombing war, named the corporations profiting from it, publicized the torture of political prisoners in the “tiger cage” prisons of South Vietnam, pushed scientists to boycott war research and denounced the use of toxic defoliants like Agent Orange. Activist groups opened direct talks with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam and sent delegations to the North. Networks of draft counselors were created. Antiwar candidates ran for office. A blossoming infrastructure gave the antiwar movement radio news outlets, documentary film capability and a syndicated news service. Law firms formed to defend its work, and networks of donors were created.

Two nationwide organizations rapidly developed. The Indochina Peace Campaign, with dozens of offices and chapters, produced educational material, coordinated protests, promoted lobbying and published a newspaper. Medical Aid for Indochina, which I led, raised money for medicines and medical equipment that we sent to North Vietnamese hospitals treating the civilian victims of American bombing.

Despite all our work, Nixon expanded the bombing of North Vietnamese cities throughout 1972. Hoping for better terms, he sabotaged peace talks before the November election, then mercilessly bombed Hanoi just before Christmas, destroying Bach Mai, its largest civilian hospital. Having failed to improve his negotiating position, and in the face of outrage over the Christmas bombing, including a well-publicized drive to rebuild Bach Mai with American donations, he signed the Paris Peace Accords in late January 1973, largely bringing America’s combat role in South Vietnam to a close.

That ended the war for the military, but not for the antiwar movement. The South Vietnam regime lived on, funded by American dollars, and its war with the North continued. Nixon had to get those dollars from Congress, and knowing that Congress could be lobbied, we saw it as the weak link in the chain holding up South Vietnam. Antiwar groups, with significant support from labor and religious networks, created the Coalition to Stop Funding the War, an enormous lobbying campaign to cut funding for South Vietnam. The national networks and experienced organizers of the antiwar movement’s fourth stage joined the coalition and coordinated aggressive lobbying efforts in congressional districts across the country.

As each of several congressional appropriations for South Vietnam came up, the coalition successfully whittled it down. Over the next two years, the South Vietnamese military ran out of fuel and ammunition and was forced to retreat. The Saigon regime, never supported by more than a small minority of its own people, finally collapsed on April 30, 1975.

Graham Martin, the last American ambassador in Saigon, called our lobbying campaign “one of the best propaganda and pressure organizations the world has ever seen.” No doubt this was self-serving hyperbole to cover his own failure to counter us, but he was right in a way: The fourth stage of the antiwar movement had mobilized enough people to force Congress to finally end the war.

Across a decade of activism, we were often a tactical mess, but our leadership was strategically coherent and relentlessly determined. On the other hand, the war was always a much bigger mess, and it never benefited from strategic coherence. In the end, it was the war that was lost and the peace that was won.

Bill Zimmerman is the author of “Troublemaker: A Memoir From the Front Lines of the Sixties.”

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< 全文和訳例 >



平和主義団体は、一般国民と報道機関への啓蒙活動を行いました。学生は、反戦活動家を育てる新しい方法を生み出しました。その方法とは、大きな成功をもたらしたキャンパスでの学生集会の開催でした。1965年の3月から6月にかけて、アメリカ中で120を超える学生集会が実施されました。4月には、民主主義を求める学生連合(Students for a Democratic Society)は、驚くことに、初めて2万人に及ぶ参加者を集めました。11月には、同じく平和主義団体の SANE(健全な核政策の為の運動)も同様の集会を開催し、同規模の参加者が集まりました。1965年末の時点では、反戦運動の最初の段階は概ね成功と言えました。反戦活動家はヴェトナムとそこでの戦争についての知識を深め、この時点では小規模だったものの抗議活動を実行し、非国民との誹りを受けながらも、反戦運動を社会に浸透させるべく努めました。戦争遂行に対する疑問の種が報道機関に植え付けられ、一般大衆も後からついてくる下地が出来上がったのです。

しかし、戦争は激化する一方でした。1966年の初頭には、軍のヴェトナムへの派遣、戦傷者数、徴兵は拡大していました。学生とそのミドルクラスの出身家庭では、軍務に就くことは想定外だった為、彼らの関心を引くことになりました。彼らの利己主義が、反戦運動の第2段階が始まる契機となったのです。それは以前にも増して大規簿になりました。上院議員のロバート・ケネディーと有力なコラムニスト、ウォルター・リップマンを含む社会の上層部からも、反戦の意見が公然と出始めるようになりました。上院議員の J.ウィリアム・フルブライトは、公聴会をTV中継し、反戦の意見が直接アメリカの一般家庭に伝えられました。1966年から67年を通して、政治、科学、医療、学術、娯楽、報道、そしてビジネス部門のリーダーでさえ、反戦の意見を表明していました。






祖国への忠誠の度合いも変化していました。反戦運動初期に主流となっていたスローガンは、”ヘイ、ヘイ、L.B.J(リンドン・バリー・ジョンソン大統領のこと)さんよ、今日は何人の子供を殺したんだい?” でした。1969年には、それは”一方は正しく、他方は間違っている、ヴェトコンに勝利を!”、に置き換わっていました。黒人は都市部で数十に及ぶ暴動を起こし、学生は、ケント州立大学(州兵が学生に発砲し4人が死亡した事件、クロズビー、スティルス、ナッシュ、& ヤング(CSNY)の ”オハイオ” はこの事件を糾弾した曲)とジャクソン州立大学での警察による学生の銃撃事件が発生すると、一層過激になりました。ヴェトナムに従軍していた兵士は、6人に1人がヘロイン中毒となり、戦闘を拒否し、その命令を下した上官を手榴弾で殺害していました。






それらの市民組織は、ニクソン大統領が北ヴェトナムへの爆撃を拡大していることを暴露し、戦争から莫大な利益を得ている企業名を公表し、南ヴェトナムの ”虎の檻” 監獄での政治犯に対する拷問を記事にし、科学者に戦争遂行の為の研究を拒否するよう促し、エージェント・オレンジの様な有毒な枯葉剤の使用を非難しました。反戦活動家のグループは、南ヴェトナム解放民族戦線(ヴェトコン)との直接対話を開始し、北ヴェトナムへ使節団を派遣しました。徴兵拒否者を支援するカウンセラーのネットワークが誕生し、反戦主義者が公職に立候補していました。この初期段階の新たな戦略基盤は、ラジオ局、ドキュメンタリー撮影とニュース同時配信の能力を備えていました。それらの活動を法的に守る為に弁護士事務所が開設され、義捐金を募るネットワークも生まれました。

二つの全国的な反戦組織が急速に発展していました。数十の事務所と支部を持つ、”インドシナ平和キャンペーン” は、啓蒙的な資料を製作し、反戦活動をコーディネートし、議会への働き掛けを強め、そして新聞を発行しました。私が責任者だった ”インドシナの為の医療支援” は、アメリカ空軍の爆撃の犠牲となった市民を治療していた北ヴェトナムの病院に送る為の薬品や医療設備を購入する資金を調達していました。




サイゴンに赴任していた最後のアメリカ大使グレアム・マーティンは、我々の議会に対するロビー活動を、”歴史上、最も優れた大衆扇動的圧力団体の一つである” と述べました。もちろん、この発言は我々の主張に効果的に反論できなかった事実を隠すための自己都合的な誇張表現に過ぎませんが、彼はある意味で正しいと言えます:即ち、反戦運動の第4段階は、最終的に連邦議会に戦争の終結を強いることが可能となるだけの数の国民を動員したのです。


To be continued.